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Apublic dialogue was organised between GaoXingjian and Ōe Kenzaburō in Aix-en-Provence inOctober 2006, formalising a personal affinity that
had developed between the two writers on previous occa-
sions. Marginality was the topic chosen for the discussion,
which was then included by Gao in his latest volume of es-
says. (2) While the event was of course not unrelated to their
status as Nobel Prize laureates for literature, Ōe becoming
the second Japanese writer to receive the prize in 1994
(after Kawabata Yasunari in 1968) and Gao the first Chi-
nese-language laureate in 2000, the connection between the
two writers was first and foremost a personal one. Ōe Ken-
zaburō, born in 1935 in Ōse village, Shikoku, and Gao
Xingjian, born in 1940 in Ganzhou, Jiangxi, are part of the
same generation, one that personally experienced many
tragic aspects of the ideologies of the twentieth century, and
they share a generally sceptical or critical attitude towards
the great narratives of modern history. In particular, both
have been singled out for their critical positions towards their
own countries: Ōe as a critic of Japan’s militaristic moderni-
sation; Gao both in the 1980s in China as a “bourgeois lib-
eral” and after the Nobel Prize as a “dissident” critic of
China from the outside. In this sense they share a marginal
position with respect to the “nations” they are sometimes
seen to represent, and more generally to the very idea of na-
tional literature.
Both studied French, Ōe under Watanabe Kazuo at Tokyo
University, where he was admitted in 1954, and Gao
Xingjian at Beijing Foreign Studies University from 1957;
their early contact with post-war French literature may have
shaped their understanding of the writer’s role in society. Ōe
was involved with the Japanese left: in 1960 he travelled to
China as a member of the Japan-China Literary Delegation
and met with Mao Zedong, before resigning from a similar
association four years later in protest against China’s atomic
bomb test (remaining a life-long opponent of nuclear
power). He also travelled to Paris to meet Sartre, on whom
he had written his master’s thesis. Gao Xingjian during this
time joined the Chinese Communist Party and became a
young cadre assigned to work at the Foreign Language
Press, which remained his work unit until the early 1980s. (3)
Through their early academic study as well as their later lit-
erary recognition, they are both enmeshed in European and
world literature, and both have been at pains to reflect on
the position this entails for them in society and in the world,
which they describe as marginal on several levels, including—
though not limited to—the position of Chinese and Japanese-
language literature in literary institutions historically domi-
nated by European languages, such as the Nobel prize. 
Both writers have taken a critical attitude towards modernity
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1. The author would like to thank Arif Dirlik and Dung Kai-cheung, as well as an anony-
mous reviewer, for their helpful comments, and Noël Dutrait for providing the tape of the
original discussion between Gao and Ōe.
2. See “Dajiang Jiansanlang yu Gao Xingjian duihua” (Dialogue between Ōe Kenzaburō
and Gao Xingjian), in Gao Xingjian, Lun Chuangzao (On Creation), Taipei, Lianjing, 2008,
pp. 324-333. This text was originally published under the title: “‘Bianyuan’ weizhi de
xiezuo dadao pushi jiazhi” (Writing in a “marginal” position attains universal value),
Mingbao yuekan, April 2007, pp. 25-30. 
3. Biographical elements from Terry Yip, “A Chronology of Gao Xingjian,” in Kwok-Kan Tam
(ed.), Soul of Chaos: Critical Perspectives on Gao Xingjian, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
University Press, 2001, pp. 311-339; Noël Dutrait, “Gao Xingjian, l’itinéraire d’un homme
seul,” Esprit, no. 280 (December 2001), pp. 146-158; Michiko Wilson, The Marginal
World of Ōe KenzaburŌ, White Plains, ME Sharpe, 1986, pp. 129-130; Maya Jaggi, “In
the forest of the soul”, The Guardian, 5 February 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
books/ 2005/feb/05/featuresreviews.guardianreview9 (3 May 2010).
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Gao Xingjian and Ōe Kenzaburō share an interest in margins that was the basis for a conversation between them in
2006. A closer comparison of Gao Xingjian’s Soul Mountain (Lingshan, 1982-1989) and Ōe Kenzaburō’s The Silent Cry
(Man’en gannen no futtobōru, 1967) also reveals a shared distrust of modernity, and a more precise preference for
the margins of local culture. This cultural critique of modernity can be documented in their essays. However,
although their respective doubts about modernity and central culture translate into similar formulations of an
individual ethics, Ōe does not share Gao’s vision of a detached writer of “cold literature,” but rather continues to
explore the political implications of his ethical stance. It is argued that their respective definitions of literature can
be viewed as explorations of an alternative form of modernity.
On the Margins of Modernity
or modernism, eschewing on one hand the idea that Asia
and Asian literature should in some way “imitate” mod-
ernism, whether political or literary, but also on the other
the symmetrical proposition that it should revert to some
kind of pre-defined “tradition.” Gao is just as scathing on the
subject of post-modernism, which he describes as the “con-
temporary sickness” of art. (4) Each writer thus takes an
oblique – or marginal – stance in addressing the question of
non-European or non-Western literature and its specificity –
desirable or not. In a way, the heart of the problem is the
definition of modernity itself, in particular the type of con-
nexion that can be drawn between the socioeconomic model
of industrial development or the political rise of liberal
democracy on the one hand, and the body of literature that
is commonly referred to as European modernism on the
other. This connexion raises the question of whether non-
European literature should strive for a different kind of
stance towards modernity. Gao and Ōe have long been in-
volved in this discussion: Gao was branded a “modernist” in
the China of the early 1980s and criticised for drawing in-
spiration from the Western avant-garde; (5) Ōe links Japanese
modernity to the politically ambiguous “modernisation” of
Meiji, which in his view prepared the way for the militarism
of the Shōwa era. Conversely, Gao has repeatedly criticised
modernism, including as early as 1987 in an essay discussed
below, and again in his Nobel lecture, while Ōe, despite his
misgivings about Meiji, endorses Sōseki’s unique form of
“modern” writing.
Examining some of the theoretical viewpoints developed in
the two authors’ Nobel lectures and other essays, this paper
will attempt to clarify their ambiguous positions regarding
modernity. It will then relate the question of modernity to
their discussion of marginality, and in particular to the impor-
tance of locality in their fiction, focusing on Gao Xingjian’s
Soul Mountain (Lingshan, 1982-1989) and Ōe Kenz-
aburō’s The Silent Cry (Man’en gannen no futtobōru or
The Football Game of the First Year of Man’en, 1967). Fi-
nally, examining the position of the writer in the context of
modernity, it will draw a distinction between the ethical val-
ues implied by Gao and Ōe.Overcoming modernity 
In one of his most dense and subtly argumentative essays,
which was written in 1987 but can be seen as a blueprint for
his 2000 Nobel lecture, Gao Xingjian examines the ques-
tion of modernity and Chinese literature. The title “Belated
modernism and present-day Chinese literature” refers to the
Chinese writers who emerged in the wake of de-Maoisation:
Gao argues that with a few exceptions (he quotes Lu Xun
and Li Jinfa), May Fourth writers were strongly influenced
by two nineteenth-century trends, Romanticism and critical
realism, and that China therefore only experienced “mod-
ernism” in the 1980s. However, recalling the historical im-
portance of the realist canon in China, he rejects the idea
that there is an incompatibility or a contradiction between
modernism and realism among the Chinese writers of the
1980s (whom he refers to as xiandaipai, reserving the term
xiandai zhuyi for early twentieth century modernism): “In
Chinese contemporary literature, drawing a simple distinc-
tion between ‘the modernists’ and realism is naturally not
helpful to the development of this literature.” (6) Therefore,
while he argues that in the age of mass communications,
“Chinese literature, which undertakes to create in the Chi-
nese language, can no longer afford not to develop commu-
nication with the literature of all nations in the world,” (7) he
also makes clear that there can be nothing mechanical about
this “communication.” The European modernists have be-
come classics, their place in world literature is established:
“But there is no need at all for us to follow in their tracks,
and to spend another half a century going over their path
one more time; even less is there a need to leave aside our
own creation in order to criticise them one by one.” (8) There-
fore, the path to modernity followed by Chinese “mod-
ernists” can only be different from the path followed in Eu-
rope, and these “modernists” should be analysed in their
own right and on their own terms. (9) European modernity
should be neither rejected nor blindly imitated.
Similarly, Ōe, in a series of talks given in Europe and Amer-
ica in the early 1990s, links the development of “modern
Japanese literature” with the political “modernisation” of the
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4. “Xiandai xing chengle dangdai bing” (Modernity has turned into a contemporary sick-
ness) in Gao, Lun Chuangzuo, pp. 130-134, for example: “The attack on society, poli-
tics and cultural tradition that modernity brought to modern art has now, in this glob-
alised, commercialised post-modernist time, been dissolved into a marketing tech-
nique based on ‘only new is good’; avant-garde art has become a global movement
promoting fashion” (pp. 130-131). Therefore it seems difficult to define Gao by any sort
of “postmodernist aspiration” (Jessica Yeung, Ink Dances in Limbo: Gao Xingjian’s
Writing as Cultural Translation, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2008, p. 99).
5. See for example Gao’s essay “Ge ri huang hua” in Meiyou zhuyi (Without -isms), Hong
Kong, Tiandi tushu, 2000, pp. 158-166; “Wilted chrysanthemums” in The Case for
Literature, translated by Mabel Lee, New Haven-London, Yale University Press, 2007, pp.
140-154. When there is a published English translation of Gao’s text, quotations are
taken from the published translation, followed by the reference in the Chinese original.
6. Gao Xingjian, Meiyou zhuyi, p. 103.
7. Ibid., pp. 100-101
8. Ibid., p. 101
9. Ibid., p. 102.
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Meiji era. While the tradition of “pure literature” or jun bun-
gaku that developed at this time was grounded in cosmopoli-
tanism—writers like Natsume Sōseki were both deeply
versed in Chinese classics and knowledgeable about contem-
porary European writers—the essence of the modernist proj-
ect rested on an ambiguity that became fully apparent after
World War Two: “Japan’s modernisation reveals the history
of an Asian country that sought to extricate itself from Asia
and become a European-style nation.” (10) In Ōe’s view, it
took place “at the cost of an ugly war which [Japan] started
in China and which left neighbouring Asian countries dev-
astated. Japan itself was reduced to a smouldering ruin.” (11)
Nonetheless, Ōe believes that this ambiguity was already
profoundly perceived by Sōseki: he quotes the protagonist
Daisuke in And Then (Sore kara, 1909) as an example of
a young intellectual complaining that Japan “poses as a first-
class power,” while at the same time being himself engulfed
by the “life appetites” for material well-being embodied in
European modernity. (12) Therefore, Ōe argues, modernisa-
tion has led to decline, “a state of outright spiritual
poverty.” (13)
This statement can be read as an echo of the theories of the
famous intellectual and sinologist Takeuchi Yoshimi on
“overcoming modernity.” (14) Using the slogan of a much-crit-
icised writers’ conference convened in 1942, Takeuchi called
for Japan to invent its own modernity, regretting that it had
simply adopted the colonialist and developmentalist model
represented by nineteenth century Europe, which from
Meiji to Shōwa led it to become a colonial power itself. This
adoption is what he calls the revenge of the slave, aspiring
to become the master’s master: “The slave refuses to recog-
nise that he is a slave. He is a true slave when he thinks he
is not a slave. And he reveals the full extent of his slavish-
ness when he becomes a master.” (15) Takeuchi concludes
that just as, in a colonial configuration, the hope always ex-
ists that the colonised may become colonisers, in Japanese
literature, even despair is transformed into hope of salvation
from outside. (16) By contrast, Lu Xun’s “desperate resist-
ance” against both tradition and modernity was, for
Takeuchi, a possible way in which to redirect the reflections
of Japanese intellectuals. (17) The title of Ōe’s Nobel lecture,
“Japan, the ambiguous, and myself” (Aimai na Nihon no
watakushi), which reflectively echoes Kawabata’s unques-
tioningly optimistic Nobel speech “Japan, the beautiful, and
myself” (Utsukushii Nihon no watakushi), highlights the
“ambiguity” of Japan’s modernisation to suggest the need to
truly “overcome modernity,” just as Takeuchi salvages the
slogan of the 1942 conference for his own critique of mod-
ern Japan. This filiation running from Lu Xun via Takeuchi
to Ōe sheds new light on how the latter positions himself
with respect to Gao, who is similarly at pains to “overcome”
aspects of modernity. 
Gao Xingjian’s 2000 Nobel lecture “The Case for Litera-
ture” (Wenxue de liyou) also addresses the apparent
achievements of modernity. The closing of the twentieth
century, in his view, marks the end of utopian politics and
the literature that accompanied them: “The illusion of a so-
cial utopia that enshrouded more than a century has van-
ished, and when literature throws off the shackles of this and
that -ism, it still has to return to the dilemmas of human ex-
istence.” (18) Literature is part and parcel of this dystopian
modernity: in the twentieth century “politics interfered with
and stifled literature to an extent that has seldom been seen
in human history”; (19) furthermore, literature itself was inhab-
ited by the “ideology of continuing revolution,” which re-
peatedly caused writers to attack both their immediate pred-
ecessors and the underlying traditions of their culture. (20) In
this way, modern Chinese literature became drowned in
“isms”: “Chinese literature in the twentieth century endured
disaster after disaster, and indeed almost reached its last
36 N o  2 0 1 0 / 2
10. K. Ōe, “On modern and contemporary Japanese literature,” in, Japan, the Ambiguous,
and Myself: The Nobel Prize Speech and Other Lectures, Tokyo-New York-London,
Kodansha International, 1995, p. 55. No mention is made of a translator or a Japanese
original in the English publication of this essay. When quoting from Ōe’s other texts,
published English translations are used, followed by the reference to the Japanese orig-
inal.
11. K. Ōe, “Speaking on Japanese culture before a Scandinavian audience,” in Japan, the
Ambiguous, and Myself, pp. 25-26; Aimai na Nihon no watashi, Tokyo, Iwanami shisho,
1995, p. 177.
12. Quoted from And then, in Ōe, Japan, the Ambiguous, and Myself, pp. 22-23; Aimai na
Nihon no watashi, pp. 175-176.
13. K. Ōe, Japan, the Ambiguous, and Myself, p. 26; Aimai na Nihon no watashi, p. 177.
14. This expression, as explained by Takeuchi, epitomises Japan’s “ambiguity,” or at least
the ambiguity of Japan’s war, presented simultaneously as a war of colonial invasion
and a war against imperialism. Takeuchi Yoshimi, What is modernity? Writings of
Takeuchi Yoshimi, edited, translated, and with an introduction by Richard F. Calichman,
New York, Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 120. For a critical perspective, see also
Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar
Japan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000. 
15. Takeuchi Yoshimi, “What is modernity? (The case of China and Japan),” in What is
modernity?, p. 72.
16. Takeuchi sees Japanese literature (and scholarship) as essentially colonial in that they
are related to an ideal existing outside that must be pursued and captured. Takeuchi Y.,
What is modernity?, p. 67. Dazai Osamu is one of the examples he gives of a writer who
transforms even despair into hope (p. 49).
17. Takeuchi ironically comments that Lu Xun was inevitably misunderstood by Japanese
writers, who saw him as a “Chinese Ōgai,” a believer in progress and modernisation
(ibid., p. 73).
18. Gao X., The Case for Literature, p. 42; Lun Chuangzuo, p. 10.
19. “Literature as Testimony: the Search for Truth,” in Gao X., The Case for Literature, p. 49 ;
Lun Chuangzuo, p. 16.
20. “Literature as Testimony,” in Gao X., The Case for Literature, p. 51; Lun Chuangzuo, 
p. 18.
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On the Margins of Modernity
gasp, because it was ruled by politics: both the revolution in
literature and revolutionary literature alike put literature and
the individual with their back to the wall.” (21) This is why
Gao Xingjian’s writing is “without -ism.” 
In “Belated Modernity,” Gao goes on to sketch out the
major differences between Western modernism and the Chi-
nese “modernists” of the 1980s, adding his own thoughts,
which often in turn set him off from the latter group. 
Firstly, [Chinese modernists] express an endorse-
ment of the self, rather than negating the self, as did
Western modernism. They assert the value of human
dignity with a Nietzschean tragic passion, rather than
undertaking a cold-blooded dissection of the self.
They are opposed to traditional feudal ethics and up-
hold the legitimacy of sexuality, rather than rejecting
the very idea of ethics and being disgusted by sexual-
ity. They reveal the absurdities within reality; they do
not see this absurdity as existence itself. (22)
Gao’s attitude towards modernism is ambiguous. He criti-
cises what he describes as (belated) “Chinese” modernism,
which appears as an avant-gardist politicised romanticism,
defined by its endorsement of Nietzsche, the will to liberate
the individual from oppressive traditions, and the possibility
for the individual to overcome the absurdities of reality. This
is the type of modernism that Gao associates with ideology
and politicised literature, because of its propensity to endow
literature with a central social role. (23) “Western modernism,”
on the other hand, is characterised by its amoral introspec-
tion into the depths of human nature. Among the long list of
names of Western modernists provided in this article, it is
Kafka—rather than the avant-garde—who no doubt tallies
most closely with Gao’s description of a cold questioning of
the self and the absurdity of all human endeavours. Kafka
has in fact already gone further than the Nietzschean writ-
ers who make Gao uncomfortable: “In the last century, Ni-
etzsche already proclaimed that God is dead, and that what
we revere is ourselves. Why does Chinese literature today
need to replace God with that very same self? What is
more, after Kafka, that self has already died. This is a time
in which old values pass away very quickly.” (24) Although he
writes earlier that there were few “modernists” in early twen-
tieth century China (presumably in the sense of writers like
Kafka), it seems clear the Gao’s criticism of the “belated”
modernists of the 1980s in fact also targets the “non-be-
lated” May Fourth writers, or at least those that were later
constructed as the May Fourth “mainstream.” This is con-
firmed by Gao’s systematic linkage between “literary revolu-
tion” and “revolutionary literature,” as in the passage from
“The Case for Literature” quoted above.
Ōe expresses similar misgivings about the emergence of
“modern literature” in Japan as a complement to the institu-
tional modernisation of the Meiji era, in a vein that can be
linked to Liang Qichao in China, for whom “new fiction”
was meant to be one among a long list of “news” necessary
to shape a “new citizen.” It is revealing to tie in Gao’s criti-
cism of the Liang Qichao-May Fourth tradition with Ōe’s
doubts about Meiji, because Liang’s idea of “political fic-
tion” was largely inspired by the emblematic Meiji intellec-
tual Fukuzawa Yukichi. (25) Both writers reject this utilitarian
or overly committed view of literature, which is somehow
linked to social and political modernity. While they under-
line their cosmopolitanism, they remain uncomfortable with
the Nietzschean or Promethean variety of modernity that, in
Gao’s view, has bestowed on literature itself a dangerously
central position in society: “We should not credit literature
with too high a value; it is only an expression of human cul-
ture. Writers are not warriors, nor are they saints with halos
on their head.” (26)
It is particularly interesting to note that, just as Ōe leaves a
special place for Sōseki as a “reluctant modernist,” the mod-
ernist who recognised the perils of modernity, (27) Gao ex-
empts Lu Xun, together with the poet Li Jinfa, from his cri-
tique of early twentieth century Chinese writers. (28) Al-
though he has elsewhere criticised Lu Xun for his 1902
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21. “The Case for Literature,” in Gao X., The Case for Literature, p. 33 (modified); Lun
Chuangzuo, p. 4.
22. Gao X., Meiyou zhuyi, p. 102.
23. For this reason, although I am in agreement with the idea of Soul Mountain as “a late,
great modernist novel in our allegedly postmodern times” (Jeffrey Kinkley, “Gao Xingjian
in the ‘Chinese’ Perspective of Qu Yuan and Shen Congwen,” Modern Chinese Literature
and Culture, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 132), it is also important to reflect on why Gao Xingjian
himself would probably not define it in this way.
24. Gao X., Meiyou zhuyi, p. 102.
25. See Hiroko Willcock, “Japanese Modernization and the Emergence of New Fiction in
Early Twentieth Century China: A Study of Liang Qichao,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 29,
no. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 817-840.
26. Gao X., Meiyou zhuyi, p. 102
27. Similarly, Takeuchi Yoshimi exempts Sōseki from his critique of “colonial” Meiji litera-
ture: “For Sōseki, Japan’s modern civilization was a failure, in that it was not internally
generated; rather it remained an external affectation through and through. Sōseki
sought in vain for a way to transform the modernizing process into an internal one”
(Takeuchi Y., What is modernity?, p. 154).
28. Gao’s ambiguous relationship with Lu Xun is evident in the discussion in Preliminary
investigation into the technique of the modern novel, in the chapter entitled “Xiandai
jiqiao yu minzu jingshen” (Xiandai xiaoshuo, op. cit., p. 113-114; translated by Ng Mau-
Sang as “Contemporary Technique and National Character in Fiction,” Renditions, 1983,
p. 55-58. See also Mabel Lee, “Gao Xingjian’s dialogue with two dead poets from
Shaoxing: Xu Wei and Lu Xun,” in Raoul Findeisen and Robert Gassman (eds.), Autumn
Floods, Bern, Peter Lang, 1998, pp. 401-414.
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poem recalling his will to “sacrifice [his] blood to the Yellow
Emperor” or his post-1927 “conversion,” he has not voiced
direct criticism of Lu Xun’s fiction—an important point, be-
cause for Ōe’s generation, Lu Xun was associated with
Takeuchi’s criticism of Meiji, and the possibility of a differ-
ent kind of modernity. Jeffrey Kinkley has formulated the hy-
pothesis of a “third type” of modernism, distinct from “West-
ern high modernism” (which he defines as directed against
positivistic modernity), and “treaty-port modernism” devoted
to “urban glitz and material and social newness.” He associ-
ates this third type with academic positions and geographi-
cal borderlands, particularly Kunming, and writers such as
Shen Congwen and, at least partially, Lu Xun. (29) It could
probably also be related to the Japanese notion of jun bun-
gaku, which, as underlined by Ōe, was originally used as an
antithesis to Meiji modernisation (by the romantic poet Ki-
tamura Tōkoku), and has now come to signify “non-commer-
cial” literature or “belles lettres.” It is this third type of “re-
luctant modernists” (Lu Xun and Sōseki) that both Gao
and Ōe are interested in, because they do not sacrifice the
marginal position of literature to the demands of the age, but
reject the central role for literature in nation-building inher-
ited from the Romantic tradition and the Promethean atti-
tude still implicit in some of Nietzsche’s writings. Marginal ity  and locali ty
For Gao and Ōe, calling into question the project of moder-
nity can be seen as a two-tiered process: it involves, on one
hand, a critique of the progress-oriented ideology of eco-
nomic development (some would probably refer to “capital-
ism”), and of colonialism or assimilation of “weak” or mar-
ginal cultures. At the same time, it is concerned with re-eval-
uating literature’s own role in legitimising this Promethean
project, and with limiting its social meaning to an individual
ethics. This re-evaluation implies that literature should dis-
tance itself not only from ideologies, but more largely from
the idea that it encapsulates a form of truth. Gao writes in
the “Author’s preface to Without -isms” that “To be without
-isms is the minimum right for a human being. Putting aside
any greater freedom, one should at least have that small free-
dom of not being a slave to any -ism.” In order to safeguard
this freedom, literature should renounce its aspirations to be-
coming a centre of power: “As the individual cannot control
this world, it would be best for him to stand to the side
rather than to think rashly that he can rule the world, or to
let himself be senselessly slaughtered by it.” (30) Marginality
is therefore the consequence of a philosophical position that
seeks to preserve its doubts about truth or the sense of his-
tory that a certain brand of confident modernist was eager to
brush aside. 
Soul Mountain resonates with this aspiration on a micro-the-
matic, structural, and philosophical level. The protagonist of
the novel, both in his “I” and “you” incarnations (which al-
ternate in even and odd-numbered chapters), sets out on a
multi-tiered quest, ostensibly in search of Soul Mountain. It
is mentioned in the first chapter by a man the you-narrator
meets on a train, and described as a place of wild men and
untouched forests: “It’s all virgin wilderness.” (31) The protag-
onist originally decides to search for this mountain as a way
to assuage his nostalgia: “You’ve lived in the city for a long
time and need to feel that you have a hometown. You want
a hometown so that you’ll be able to return to your childhood
to recollect lost memories.” (32) In Chapter 2, this quest is
echoed by its more rationalised variant expressed by the I-
narrator: “While you search for the route to Lingshan, I wan-
der along the Yangtze River, looking for this sort of reality.
I have just gone through a crisis (…) I should have left those
polluted surroundings long ago and returned to nature to
look for this kind of real life.” (33) In Chapter 3, the second
“you” chapter, when the narrator reaches the town of Wuyi,
he is transported back to his childhood by the sounds and
smells of the mountain village, and believes he recognises
the language of Song tales when he hears the peasants
speak. The “you” chapters serve, throughout the novel, to
expand on this theme of the roots of Chinese culture, and
are continuously interlaced with references to the heterodox
and popular tradition recorded in works such as Of Moun-
38 N o  2 0 1 0 / 2
29. J. Kinkley, “Gao Xingjian in the ‘Chinese’ Perspective,” pp. 143-145. This categorisation
is perhaps a little misleading: the bulk of Chinese literary modernism is associated with
May Fourth and a form of social commitment—very different from “treaty-port mod-
ernism” if this is defined as inspired by the European avant-garde (although parts of the
avant-garde were also very political). It might be more useful to see this “third type” as
neither committed to social causes (May Fourth) nor preoccupied with formal experi-
ments (treaty-port). Jeffrey Kinkley has given an extensive analysis of the type of mod-
ernism he has in mind based on three stories by Shen Congwen (“Shen Congwen
among the Chinese modernists,” Monumenta Serica, no. 54, 2006, pp. 311-341).
Regarding Gao and modernism, see also Mabel Lee, “Gao Xingjian on the Issue of
Literary Creation of the Modern Writer,” in K. K. Tam (ed.), The Soul of Chaos, pp. 21-41;
and Mabel Lee, “Gao Xingjian: Contre une modernité esthétique,” in N. Dutrait (ed.),
L’écriture romanesque et théâtrale de Gao Xingjian, Paris, Le Seuil, 2006, pp. 13-23, an
article dedicated to investigating Gao’s anti-Nietzschean stance. Similarly, in the
Japanese context, Ōe can be seen as harking back to a “third” type of modernism
(Sōseki), which is neither defined by a political agenda (Fukuzawa Yukichi) nor endors-
es modernist “neo-sensationism” (Kawabata), which could be compared to Chinese
“treaty-port” literature.
30. Gao X., The Case for Literature, pp. 29, 27 (modified); Meiyou zhuyi, pp. 2, 4.
31. Gao X., Soul Mountain, trans. Mabel Lee, New York, Harper-Collins, 2000, p. 3; Lingshan
(Soul Mountain), Hong Kong, Tiandi tushu (simplified character edition), 2000, p. 3.
32. Gao X. Soul Mountain, p. 8; Lingshan, p. 8.
33. Gao X. Soul Mountain, p. 12 (modified); Lingshan, p. 11.
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tains and Seas, and other compendia of legends. Here, lo-
cality (hometown, childhood, the mountain village) serves as
a geographical translation of marginality in that it fractures
the idea of the national into countless variations and compo-
nents.
Chapter 52, in which “you” is described as an emanation or
the “shadow” of “I,” explicitly connects the two quests: 
Wallowing in my imagination, I travel into my inner
mind with you who are my reflection. Which is more
important? This perennial and perplexing question
can become a debate as to which is more real, or
even sometimes an argument. Let people debate or
argue. It really has no connection with the spiritual
voyage that I or you, immersed in travel, is experienc-
ing. (34)
The convergence of the two quests or their capacity to com-
plement each other demonstrates that by alternating imagi-
nation and reality, the narrator continues to seek a form of
totality and authenticity: simultaneously the origin of Chi-
nese civilisation, the true nature of his own self and origin,
a pristine natural environment untouched by culture, and fi-
nally the “truth” that literature purports to reveal. 
However, this quest for unity and authenticity fractures into
myriad multiplicity. The most obvious thematic symbol of
this is the fragmentation of Chinese culture, first into alter-
native popular traditions, in the imagination of the you-nar-
rator (Taoist legends, local folklore, such as the story of the
qi snake, a Jin-era chuanqi about a nun who washes her own
intestines every day in Chapter 48 (35)), and simultaneously
into the countless minority cultures in the anthropological re-
search conducted by the I-narrator: the Yi (chapters 20, 22),
the Qiang (chapters 2, 68), and the Miao (chapters 39, 41,
43). In Chapter 59, the I-narrator marvels: “It’s not unique
to the ethnic minorities, the Han nationality also has a gen-
uine folk culture which hasn’t been contaminated by Confu-
cian ethical teachings!” (36) This idea, which can be traced to
pre-May Fourth thinkers such as Zhang Binglin, and is for-
mulated most cogently in Gao’s essay “Literature and meta-
physics” (Wenxue yu xuanxue), (37) is in fact already an im-
portant aspect of “Belated modernity.” In this essay, Gao
first expressed the opposition between the unified culture of
the Yellow River basin, echoed in the centralising aspects of
Confucianism and its practice of jiaohua (the term translated
by “Confucian ethical teachings” in the previous quotation),
and the countless marginal cultures strewn along the Yangzi
river, which he terms “non-literati culture” (fei wenren wen-
hua). (38) Chinese literature has of course long drawn inspira-
tion from these marginal cultures expressed in Taoism and
local traditions. 
These ideas are very evidently steeped in the debates of the
1980s about “root-searching” (xungen) literature and, as un-
derlined by Jeffrey Kinkley, the opposition between “yel-
low” and “blue” China, famously illustrated in the television
series River Elegy. (39) They are also related to an early-twen-
tieth century interest in locality that is documented from
Zhang Binglin to Zhou Zuoren and Shen Congwen. Kink-
ley ties this aspect in with modernism, arguing that once
again in the 1980s, modernism is defined by the search for
primitivism. The structure of the novel, however, introduces
a different perspective. While the narrator does indeed start
out by searching for “primitive,” “authentic” culture, “uncon-
taminated” by Confucianism, this quest is repeatedly broken
and diffracted. Lingshan, Soul Mountain, fractures into a
multiplicity of places, such as Lingyan, Soul Rock, where
women come to pray for male children. The conclusion can
only be that there is no source of Chinese culture, any more
than there is a pristine nature (in Chapter 75, the narrator
underlines that the Yangzi itself is entirely polluted, from its
source to the sea) or a true “self” that can be separated from
the world. In a very striking image, the “wild man” thus iron-
ically turns out to be a persecuted Rightist in hiding (Chap-
ter 61). (40) The narrator sees his own identity fracturing into
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34. Gao X. Soul Mountain, p. 312-313 (modified); Lingshan, p. 298. In this instance, Mabel
Lee translates zhenshi (hezhe geng wei zhenshi) as “authentic” (“which is more authen-
tic”), while in the previous quotation from Chapter 2, she translates zhenshi (xunzhao
zhezhong zhenshi) as “reality” (“looking for this sort of reality”); I have therefore modi-
fied the occurrence in Chapter 52 to “which is more real.” Noël and Liliane Dutrait’s
French translation does the opposite: in Chapter 2, zhenshi is translated as “truth” (“je
recherche la vérité”, Gao X., La Montagne de l’âme. trans. Noël and Liliane Dutrait, La
Tour d’Aigues, L’Aube, p. 25), while in Chapter 52, it is translated as “real” (“Lequel est
le plus réel?” ibid., p. 422).
35. The insertion of this tale, which also occurs in Gao’s play Between Life and Death, is
commented on at length by Gang Gary Xu as a trope for moral introspection (“My
Writing, your Pain, and her Trauma: Pronouns and Gendered Subjectivity in Gao
Xingjian’s Soul Mountain and One Man’s Bible,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture,
vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 99-129; pp. 100-101). Xu refers it to a seventeenth century story by
Drunken Master Heart-Moon of West Lake (Zui Xihu xin yue zhuren), while the narrator
presents it in the opening lines of the chapter as a Jin-era legend. The reference to sex-
ually daring literati fiction of the late Ming is perhaps less crucial to the narrator’s stat-
ed purpose of collecting ancient legends (and his implicit endorsement of Jin-era het-
erodox traditions), but it effectively pinpoints the extent to which the purportedly
“primeval” texts of “authentic” Chinese culture have in fact been rewritten over and over
again.
36. Gao X. Soul Mountain, p. 358 (modified); Lingshan, p. 341.
37. See Gao X., Meiyou zhuyi, pp. 167-182; The Case for Literature, pp. 82-103.
38. Gao X., “Chidao de xiandai zhuyi” in Meiyou zhuyi, p. 105.
39. J. Kinkley, “Gao Xingjian in the ‘Chinese’ Perspective,” p. 142.
40. The play The Other Shore (Bi’an) is also part of this discussion: in addition to illustrating
the inexistence of a transcendent “other shore” (which can also stands for authenticity
or the “truth”), the play can also be read as a trope for the painful process of remem-
bering the Cultural Revolution, as argued convincingly by Syren Quah in this issue. 
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a multiplicity of personal pronouns. No more is there a
“truth” to literature, as the narrator concludes in the last
chapter: “Pretending to understand, but still not understand-
ing. In fact I comprehend nothing, I understand nothing.
That’s the way it is.” (41) The fragmentation of the self, care-
fully constructed in the novel, is an essential component of
Gao’s sceptical stance about literature’s capacity to reveal
any form of truth, and at the same time an unmistakable en-
dorsement of the power of modernist form to guard against
the excesses of modern politics. (42) In a break with early
twentieth century and 1980s perspectives, locality in Gao’s
novel no longer stands for authenticity.
But experiencing the inexistence of a centre, of Soul Moun-
tain, of a coherent self and a single truth, is in fact liberat-
ing. As the old man in Chapter 76 says: “The road is not
wrong, it is the traveller who is wrong.” (43) Rather than the
inaccessibility of the “other,” as suggested by Gary Xu, (44)
this sequence seems to underline that the traveller who in-
vests the “other shore” with metaphysical meaning (no mat-
ter whether it pertains to the search for a true self in a Bud-
dhist context, the authentic meaning of the world, or the
roots of culture) is all too easily led to neglect the empirical
other, his fellow human beings and the world they in-
habit. (45) Gao Xingjian repeatedly rejected the idea of
“roots” or authenticity in “Belated Modernity,” in Chapter
72 of Soul Mountain, and again in “Literature and meta-
physics”: “I am not an anticulturalist, but I don’t recognise
myself as a ‘roots-searching’ writer, because those roots have
been under my feet from the time of my birth. The question
is how to understand them, including how to understand my-
self.” (46) Nonetheless, Gao Xingjian’s version of modernity
should not be seen as a post-modern renouncement of all
quests for truth, authenticity, or the self; it simply implies
that these quests cannot be defined by their object: there is
no “root,” no “self,” no “origin,” no “Chineseness” to be
found at the end of the quest. It is the quest itself and the
multiplicity of answers and encounters it offers that make it
worthwhile. 
Gao discusses this in his essay “Literature as testimony,” the
subtitle of which reads in Chinese: Dui zhenshi de zhuiqiu,
translated by Mabel Lee as “The Search for Truth.” This is
a perfectly acceptable translation, provided that “truth” is
understood as zhenshi, i.e. “empirical truth,” rather than
“philosophical truth” (zhenli). For this reason, and in keep-
ing with the translation of zhenshi in Soul Mountain (see
note 9 above), it is perhaps clearer to follow Noël and Lil-
iane Dutrait’s French translation of the subtitle as “The
search for reality.” (47) Gao discusses this at the end of the
essay: “One does not reach reality [zhenshi] by relying on
metaphysical speculation. Reality is so perceptual and so
down-to-earth, it is alive in human perceptions at any time
and any place, it is the blending of the subject and the ob-
ject.” (48) No matter whether zhenshi is translated as “truth”
(as Mabel Lee chooses to do in this passage) or as “reality,”
Gao Xingjian underlines that the kind of truth available to
literature is of an intrinsically immanent nature, and as such
can only be sought within reality. Locality is therefore also
an image of the diversity of empirical truth.
Kenzaburō Ōe has taken a similar stance on the issue of
central and local culture, in particular the cultures of Oki-
nawa (49) and his native island of Shikoku. In the lecture “On
Japanese culture before a Scandinavian audience,” Ōe men-
tions this interest as the immediate source for the novel The
Silent Cry: “One of the motives I had for writing this novel
was my growing awareness at the time of a culture in Japan
very different from the dominant Tokyo one.” This led Ōe
to become interested in Okinawa, “which even now retains
its non-Yamato cultural identity, blessed with the richness
and diversity peculiar to peripheral culture.” (50) He adds that
this village culture, rooted in traditional cosmology and life-
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41. Gao X. Soul Mountain, p. 506 (modified); Lingshan, p. 484.
42. For this reason, I am doubtful about Julia Lovell’s understanding of Soul Mountain as a
novel in which scepticism is “conquered by romanticism,” in which the self regresses
to a “romantic core behind a modernist façade” and is in the end “capable of speaking
truth for the people” (“Gao Xingjian, the Nobel Prize and Chinese Intellectuals: Notes on
the Aftermath of the Nobel Prize 2000,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture, vol. 14,
no. 2, pp. 1-50; p. 22). See also Jessica Yeung’s slightly different assessment of the
novel as “a hollow gesture to maintain the appearance of an avant-garde novel, which
is in consumed just like any other literary spectacle” (Ink Dances in Limbo, p. 99).
43. Gao X. Soul Mountain, p. 478; Lingshan, p. 457.
44. See G. Xu, “My Writing, your Pain, and her Trauma,” p. 117.
45. In this sense I think that Gary Xu’s reference to Emmanuel Lévinas and the specific quo-
tation “through my relation with the Other I am in touch with God” is misleading,
because Gao Xingjian is precisely concerned with the necessity NOT to invest the
“other” with metaphysical meaning, but to take pleasure in the empirical world and the
chance encounters with fellow human beings it allows the traveller. It remains true that,
if the “other” is hypostatised in Xu’s sense, then it becomes inaccessible. Gao on the
other hand believes that literature can reach the other: “However difficult it may be for
people locked into their own experience to understand each other, if with the help of lit-
erature there can be some communication, no matter how small, this originally aimless
act of writing leaves human beings with a testimony to their existence. And if literature
still has some significance, it is probably this.” (“Literature as testimony” in The Case
for Literature, p. 63 (modified); Lun Chuangzuo, p. 28.
46. Gao X., The Case for Literature, p. 103 (modified); Meiyou zhuyi, p. 182
47. See “Le témoignage de la littérature. La recherche du réel” in Gao X., Le témoignage de
la littérature, trans. Liliane and Noël Dutrait, Paris, Le Seuil, 2004, pp. 135-158.
48. Gao X., The Case for Literature, p. 60 (modified); Lun Chuangzuo, p. 25.
49. Ōe was taken to court by a group representing the Japanese army over his book
Okinawa Notes (1970), in which he states that Okinawans were driven to suicide at the
end of the war. An Osaka court ruled in his favour in March 2008. See Steve Rabson,
“Case Dismissed,” Japan Focus, 8 April 2008, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Steve-
Rabson/2716 (5 May 2010). 
50. K. Ōe, Japan, the Ambiguous and Myself, pp. 31 and 32; Aimai na Nihon no watakushi,
pp. 181 and 182.
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cycles “has been my way of resisting, on a mythological
level, the homogenising, centristic culture that has exerted its
influence even over my own home in Shikoku,” (51) adding
that “my novels may fall further out of the mainstream, inso-
far as they are based on folktales and mythology that pose a
direct challenge to the emperor system.” (52) Recalling the
colonisation and brutalisation of Okinawa by imperial Japan,
in a vein similar to Gao’s depiction of Confucian jiaohua,
Ōe recommends that Japan should learn from Okinawa and
Korea “how not to be at the centre.” (53)
The Silent Cry ostensibly portrays just such a quest for au-
thenticity and locality, which as in Soul Mountain turns out
to be problematic. It is the story of two brothers, Takashi
and Mitsusaburō, in the aftermath of the protests against the
renewal of the American-Japanese Security Treaty in 1960.
Takashi has taken part in the protests against the treaty, then
has travelled to America with a Japanese theatre troupe
(named “Our Shame”) to search for atonement. Finally, re-
turning to Japan, he decides to move back to the village of
his ancestors in Shikoku in order to begin “a new life,” tak-
ing his older brother and his wife with him on the pretext
that the owner of the local supermarket wants to buy their
old family property. (54) In the seemingly untouched world of
the forests of Shikoku, they return to a world of semi-leg-
endary characters: the mythical Chōsokabe, the elusive her-
mit Gii, a legendary “wild man” in the forest who makes an
appearance in Chapter 12, and the immensely obese Jin,
the caretaker of the family house. The figure of Gii (the
main figure in Ōe’s Flaming Green Tree trilogy) is com-
mented on by the narrator Mitsusaburō with a quote from
the famous Japanese folklorist Yanagita Kunio (about a
naked women he had observed), confirming that Gii is
closely related to an intellectual concern with the signifi-
cance of local culture. (55) Furthermore Ōe has introduced an
implicit link between Shikoku and Okinawa: according to
the author, the brothers’ clan name Nedokoro is derived
from an Okinawan word meaning “place of one’s roots,” (56)
which ties in with the quest that Takashi is pursuing: 
In America, I often heard the word ‘uprooted,’ but
now that I’ve come back to the valley in an attempt to
make sure of my own roots, I find they’ve all been
pulled up. I’ve begun to feel uprooted myself. So now
I’ve got to put down new roots here, and to do so I
naturally feel some action is necessary.” (57)
The protagonists’ critical stance toward post-war Japanese in-
dustrial modernity therefore seems to entail a quest for a more
authentic form of culture, not unlike in the China of the 1980s.
The search for roots leads to the discovery of a parallel be-
tween the dates of the anti-American actions of 1960 and a
village revolt crushed by the two protagonists’ great-grandfa-
ther in 1860, the “First year of Man’en” that gives the novel
its title. (58) This revolt, directed against what the villagers per-
ceived to be an excessively high interest rate taken by the
Nedokoro great-grandfather, was led by his younger brother:
the peasants attempted to set fire to the family house and oc-
cupied the sake distillery. (59) The interpretation of the novel
itself hinges to a large extent on how to make sense of this
rebellion and, at the same time, how to legitimise its re-en-
actment by Takashi 100 years later. While Mitsusaburō
clearly states, “For my part, I was incapable of joining a
mob, either in my dreams or in reality,” (60) Takashi leads the
village youths in a new version of this uprising against the
“Supermarket Emperor,” a Korean industrialist accused of
raising prices excessively and at the same time contributing
to the rampant commercialisation and “Americanisation” of
this previously pristine forest village. 
The two revolts raise similar issues of political legitimacy.
While the narrator is in sympathy with the necessity of re-
sisting a certain form of modernity, and is less than enthusi-
astic about selling their old house to the Supermarket Em-
peror, he does not condone the violence and the “revolution-
ary” methods of his brother, who institutionalises looting as
the only form of legitimate economic exchange, and refuses
to take Mitsusaburō’s money when he tries to buy something
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51. K. Ōe, Japan, the Ambiguous and Myself, p. 35; Aimai na Nihon no watakushi, p. 184.
52. K. Ōe, Japan, the Ambiguous and Myself, p. 37; Aimai na Nihon no watakushi, p. 185.
53. K. Ōe, “Japan’s Dual Identity: A Writer’s Dilemma,” in Japan, the Ambiguous and Myself,
p. 98. This text also seems to be an English “original.”
54. K. Ōe, The Silent Cry, New York, Kodansha International, 1974, p. 37; Man’en gannen no
futtubōru in Ōe KenzaburŌ shŌsetsu, TŌkyŌ, ShinchŌsha, vol. 3, 1996, p. 41.
55. K. Ōe, The Silent Cry, p. 56; Man’en gannen no futtubōru, p. 57. The reference to
Yanagita Kunio is interesting in a Sino-Japanese context because Yanagita was a major
source of inspiration for Zhou Zuoren, shaping his preoccupation with local culture (pop-
ular Daoism and shamanism) as an alternative to state Confucianism. Prasenjit Duara
believes that this form of resistance to both capitalist modernity and Confucian tradition
was inspired by Yanagita’s critique of State Shintoism and its instrumentalisation by
Meiji politicians. Zhou Zuoren wrote the essay “Locality and literature” in order specifi-
cally to encourage writers to draw inspiration from local culture. See Zhou Z., “Difang
yu wenyi,” Zhuo Zuoren ji, Guangzhou, Huacheng, 2004, vol. 1, pp. 60-62; and Prasenjit
Duara, “Local Worlds: the Poetics and Politics of the Native place in Modern China,” The
South Atlantic Quarterly, 99/1 (Winter 2000), pp. 13-45, in particular pp. 16-19. Zhou
Zuoren’s views can also easily be related to Lu Xun and Shen Congwen’s fiction.
56. See “Speaking on Japanese Culture before a Scandinavian Audience,” in Japan, the
ambiguous, and myself, p. 33; Aimai na Nihon, p. 182.
57. K. Ōe, The Silent Cry, p. 59; Man’en gannen no futtobōru, pp. 59-60.
58. The Man’en era lasted a little more than a year, from 1860 to 1861. 
59. K. Ōe, The Silent Cry, p. 104; Man’en gannen no futtobōru, p. 98.
60. K. Ōe, The Silent Cry, p. 106; Man’en gannen no futtobōru, p. 99.
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at the supermarket. His attitude is portrayed as barbaric, in
particular the racist violence he directs against the Korean
businessman. He in fact uses local culture for his own ends
in reviving the Nembutsu dance and turning it into an anti-
modern ritual. (61) Finally, having seduced Mitsusaburō’s
wife, Takashi accuses himself of raping and murdering a vil-
lage girl, and commits suicide after a lengthy “confession” to
his brother. Mitsusaburō himself comes to discover that the
“new life” in the valley that his brother enticed him with was
an illusion: 
So I’d returned to the valley in search of my
“thatched hut.” But I’d merely been deceived by the
unexpected veneer of sobriety that Takashi had ac-
quired (…). My “new life” in the valley was only a
ruse devised by Takashi to forestall my refusal and
clear the way for him to sell the house and land for
the sake of whatever obscure purpose was firing him
at the moment. From the very outset, the journey to
the valley hadn’t really existed for me. Since I no
longer had any roots there, nor made any attempt to
put down new ones, even the house and land were as
good as nonexistent; it was no wonder my brother
should have been able to filch them from me with
only a minimal exercise of cunning. (62)
Here also, the quest for roots, for a personal truth, entails
only successive revelations of shameful family secrets,
whereas the spirit of resistance and of marginality suppos-
edly hidden in the local culture of Shikoku is manipulated,
consciously or unconsciously, in the service of an oppressive
political ideology of purity from modernisation and regres-
sion into a primitive form of life. (63) In this sense, one may
say that for Ōe, just as for Gao, the search for roots, for local
culture, for the self, is not a search for a final revelation, and
that any purported revelation of the truth, especially if the
claim is made by literature, will turn out to be illusory and,
most probably, tragic. 
It is important to note that for both writers, at the same time
as the centrality of cultural tradition fragments into locality,
the self is also fractured into a multiplicity of experiences. It
is needless to dwell on Gao Xingjian’s division of the narra-
tion into I-chapters and you-chapters, in addition to some-
times introducing a “he” or a “she” who may be linked with
various aspects of the self, which thus fails to coalesce into
a coherent whole. Interestingly, while in his 1987 essay “Be-
lated modernity,” Gao Xingjian placed personal pronouns,
along with verbal tenses, in the category of influence from
western languages that was not necessarily beneficial to Chi-
nese literature, (64) in his 2006 discussion with Ōe, he
stresses that the division of the self into the three aspects of
“I,” “you,” and “he/she” is universal and common to all lan-
guages and cultures. (65) A similar case can be made for the
fracturing of the self in Ōe’s novel through the trope of fam-
ily relations. Mitsusaburō’s dead older brother, his revolted
younger brother, his raped and dead sister, his mentally im-
paired child, the re-enactment of the family conflict between
his great-grandfather and his younger brother, represent so
many different ways of considering the self. Despite his
“rooted” family name, Mitsusaburō is unable to reach a co-
herent understanding of his self by simply returning to his an-
cestral village.
For Ōe too, it is the quest itself that is important, and the
various layers of conflicting truths it brings to light. Ōe has a
special preference for grotesque characters and their stories,
and expressed to Gao his personal identification with the
“fat woman” who tries to predict the future to the I-narrator
in Chapter 14 of Soul Mountain. (66) Ōe connects his inter-
est in peripheral cultures not with a search for authenticity,
but with the Bakhtinian idea of the novel: “As someone who
left his native village for Tokyo and whose eyes had been
opened by the study of European culture there, I had redis-
covered—through my encounter with Okinawa—my own for-
est home, the fertile ground in which my writing had devel-
oped.” (67) Similarly, in his dialogue with Gao Xingjian in
Aix-en-Provence, he jokingly remarks that margin in Japan-
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61. Performed during a Festival for the dead, the dance is supposed to exorcise spirits who
may return to haunt the village, such as a young man killed at Hiroshima and, more
importantly, Takashi and Mitsusaburō’s brother, who was killed during a revolt in the
Korean ghetto after the war (Chapter 7). Takashi revives it to replicate the anti-authori-
tarian frenzy of the peasant revolt of one hundred years before.
62. K. Ōe, The Silent Cry, pp. 134-135; Man’en gannen no futtubōru, p. 122.
63. Fredric Jameson writes that while “new regionalism” represents an “inevitable protest
against urban standardization and the destruction of nature and the peasantry” in the
contemporary context, “it also tends to organize itself into an ideology and a compen-
satory fantasy rather than a political program. The Silent Cry, however, teaches us that
we must grasp ‘the power of the land’ as the recovery of history […]. The 1960 looting
of the new capitalist supermarket (in The Silent Cry) once again recapitulates the cycle
of revolt that resonates through Oe’s novels, now in mythical form (in M/T and the
Marvels of the Forest, 1986), and now in the grim and bloody desperation of The Silent
Cry.” (“Madmen like Kings” in The Modernist Papers, London, Verso, 2007, p. 370). In
this way, the authenticity of the terroir reveals itself as an illusory alternative that gives
way to the conscientious probing of history (as discussed in the last part of the present
article below).  
64. Gao writes, “Does the strict division between the three personal pronouns suit the think-
ing habits of Chinese people?”, “Chidao de xiandai zhuyi,” Meiyou zhuyi, p. 107
65. Gao X., Lun Chuangzuo, p. 330.
66. Ōe brings this up in his discussion with Gao (Gao X., Lun Chuangzuo, p. 329). Many
thanks to Professor Iizuka Yūtori for pointing out that Ōe has himself reused this char-
acter in his recent novel Urei kao no dōji (The infant with a melancholy face).
67. K. Ōe, “Speaking on Japanese culture before a Scandinavian Audience,” in Japan, the
ambiguous, p. 33; Aimai na Nihon, p. 183.
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ese is shūhen but also hashi, which is homophonous with
hashi meaning “bridge”: the margin is therefore also con-
nected to the world. (68) This provides the meaning of the de-
nouement of the novel, in which Mitsusaburō, having buried
his brother and sold the house, decides to take up a job in
Africa to “see the world.” In this preference for life over
truth, for the experience of diversity over any sort of meta-
physical revelation, Gao Xingjian and Ōe Kenzaburō are in-
deed probably so close that “there is nothing to discuss” be-
tween them, as Ōe put it in Aix. 
The two authors’ doubts about modernity give rise to a new
stance, on one hand forward-looking and cosmopolitan with-
out being iconoclastic or utopian; on the other concerned
with the past and those “left behind” by history without ad-
vocating regression or nostalgia. The concern for the geo-
graphical margins in Soul Mountain is therefore not so much
a “root-seeking” search for authenticity as it is a concern
with finding a position in which the writer is not obliged to
espouse any form of centrality. Ōe’s preoccupation with en-
visioning central culture from the viewpoint of local cultures
underscores that this concern is not tied to China’s specific
history. In this sense Gao and Ōe are both preoccupied with
on the one hand voicing their doubts about the ideology of
progress, and at the same time resisting any form of regres-
sion into the purported “authenticity” of tradition, which for
both of them can only be a romantic reconstruction. It
should not be forgotten that the technique of alternating pro-
nouns used by Gao to fragment the stable self is clearly iden-
tified by him as modernistic as early as 1981 in Preliminary
investigation into the technique of modern fiction. (69)
This type of marginality and fragmentation are certainly not
unknown to European modernists; their function is nonethe-
less uniquely highlighted by Gao and Ōe. While neither of
them defines himself primarily as an “Asian” writer, both
have reflected on the possible meaning of such a category,
Gao when he declared that Soul Mountain was his attempt
to write the long-awaited “great Asian novel” (originally
planned to be two or three times as long, but cut short after
1989), (70) and Ōe in relation to the necessity for post-war
Japanese writers to symbolically “leave Europe” and “enter
Asia.” (71) Their attitude towards the notion of Asia is quite
similar to Takeuchi Yoshimi’s idea of “Asia as method.” (72)
Rather than constituting a form of “belated” modernism,
their preoccupation with the local and the marginal can be
traced back to the beginnings of Chinese and Japanese
modernity, and to those intellectuals who rejected a central
position for writers in achieving “wealth and power” for their
country. Avoiding the idea of “belatedness” and the impulse
it implies for imitation and “catching up,” they seek a mar-
ginal position that also construes in a positive way the mar-
ginality of Japan and China with regard to nineteenth-cen-
tury industrialisation.Indiv iduality  and ethics
Luckily for the discussion, there are also important differ-
ences between the two writers. Marginality represents for
both Gao and Ōe a critique of modernity, and is thus simi-
lar in its negative dimension. But the marginal position, pos-
itively defined as an individual ethics, takes quite different
aspects in the two authors’ works. In Gao’s case, marginality
is closely linked with the ideas of escape, “cold literature,”
and preserving the individual voice. Ōe is more committed
to constructing an ethical position that goes deeper than the
fragmentation the self must confront when it enters the
world. Defining himself in his Nobel lecture as the heir of
the Japanese post-war writers, and aspiring to “cling to the
very end of that literary tradition inherited from those writ-
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Gao Xingjian and Ōe Kenzaburō
in Aix-en-Provence in 2006.
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ers,” (73) he links his marginality with a form of commitment
that was defining for this generation: “Using the ‘image sys-
tem of grotesque realism’ as a literary weapon, and explor-
ing the cultural characteristics of the marginal areas of my
own country and Asia, I have moved along the same path,
one leading toward the ‘relativisation’ of an emperor-centred
culture.” (74) He insists on the “humaniste” spirit of Rabelais
transmitted by his professor Watanabe Kazuo. 
Despite this difference, both authors reject the idea of an
ideological “truth” imparted by literature and share the idea
of “self-preservation” of the writer, with remarkable paral-
lels in their writing. In Soul Mountain, the important thing
is simply to survive, as the I-narrator states in Chapter 75:
“I’m just fighting to survive, no I’m not fighting for any-
thing, I’m just protecting myself. I don’t have the courage of
that woman and I have not reached a state of utter despair
yet, I still madly love this world, I haven’t lived enough.” (75)
Survival and the preservation of one’s own “small voice” are
the only authorial stance that can be construed from the
novel; nonetheless, this “love for the world” should not be
interpreted in an overly negative way, as fear of death, but
also as enjoyment of life. In Chapter 28 of Soul Mountain,
the I-narrator, stuck in a small mountain village because of
a surly bus driver, relishes the idea that he is in no hurry to
go anywhere: “It’s not my mission to save some strange
creature or to save the world.” (76) Faced with the obviously
unreasonable construction project of the Three Gorges
Dam in Chapter 51, the I-narrator offers little specific com-
ment: “I am always searching for meaning, but what, in the
end, is meaning?  (…) I can only search for the self of the
I who is small and insignificant like a grain of sand.” (77) To
this the you-narrator replies in the following chapter that the
novel is “the same as life and does not have an ultimate
goal.” (78) In this absence of transcendent meaning, the im-
manence of life has the highest value: it is to be both pre-
served and enjoyed.
There is also a strong element of survival through self-
preservation in The Silent Cry, which is structured around
a repeated scene in which one of the protagonists hides in
an underground cellar or secret room. At the beginning of
the novel, one morning before dawn, Mitsusaburō, holding
his dog, crawls into a pit in his garden that has been dug to
install a septic tank. There, he meditates on the suicide of
his best friend, who has hanged himself, his face painted
red and a cucumber stuck into his anus. In the last chapter,
when he returns to the old house one last time, after
Takashi’s death, on the day the Supermarket Emperor
plans to tear it down, Mitsusaburō repeats his act of retreat
from the world, crawling into a pit in the cellar to meditate
on his brother’s suicide, seeking a form of meaning that will
allow him to continue living.
However, the pit is situated inside a hidden cellar that he
discovers on this occasion, and which contains papers and
books related to the 1860 uprising. It turns out that Mitsus-
aburō’s great-grandfather’s younger brother did not in fact
flee to America after the failed rebellion, but hid out for ten
years in the hole in the cellar. He wrote letters in which he
pretended to be on a ship to America, but all the while con-
tinued to reflect and read about revolts against the imperial
system and theories of democracy (writings by the philoso-
pher and translator Nakae Chōmin). (79) Not only does this
revelation clear the younger brother’s honour, it also reveals
him as the inspiration and probably the leader of another re-
volt in Ōkubo in 1871, which succeeded, without bloodshed,
in obtaining the resignation (and suicide) of a dictatorial of-
ficial. It is in this way suggested as an alternative to the failed
rebellion led by Takashi one hundred years later, which is
denounced as a political illusion. The great-uncle’s final let-
ter, a critique of the Meiji Constitution of 1889, which Mit-
susaburō had in fact discovered earlier but hidden from
Takashi, attests to the degree of his democratic conscience.
Distinguishing between “recovered rights” wrested by popu-
lar movements from below, and “conferred rights” granted
by a despotic government from above, he criticises the Meiji
Constitution as an example of the latter. (80) In this case,
therefore, the great-uncle’s “escape” from the world and
“self-preservation” is invested with a form of political mean-
ing—a critique of Meiji authoritarian modernisation—that is
absent from Gao’s novel. Gao’s narrator “still madly loves
the world,” and this alone is sufficient for him to bestow
meaning on his self-preservation. Mitsusaburō does not love
it, but the example of successful “self-preservation” by his
great-uncle gives him the will to try one more time to live in
the world by taking up the job in Africa. 
Regarding this difference, Gao Xingjian addressed Kenz-
aburō Ōe directly, telling him that he admired him for being
“a modern-day Sisyphus,” always willing to try one more
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time to change the world through writing, an attitude that
Gao considers both admirable and tragic. (81) He has also di-
rectly compared Ōe to Lu Xun. (82) In Chapter 65 of Soul
Mountain, the narrator professes a similar philosophy: “I
can’t play the tragic role of the defeated hero who fights
against fate, but I greatly revere those dauntless heroes who
charge into danger, like Xingtian, the legendary hero, who
picked up his own cut-off head and continued fighting.” (83)
Ōe’s conception of the ethical stance of the fiction writer
can be construed from the criticism levelled by Takashi at his
brother, who thinks that literature is inherently deceptive:
Writers? Occasionally, I admit, they tell something
near the truth and survive without either being beaten
to death or going mad. They deceive other people with
a framework of fiction, but what essentially undermines
the work of an author is the very fact that, provided one
imposes a framework of fiction, one can get away with
anything; however frightening, dangerous, or shameful
it may be. However serious the truth he may be telling,
the writer at least is always aware that in fiction he can
say anything he wants, so he’s immune from the start
to any poison his words may contain. (84)
Ōe’s novels and writings are a response to this accusation of
impunity or irresponsibility, in that they seek ethical founda-
tions for an individual on the margins. A similar critique
could well be directed against some of Gao Xingjian’s more
extreme assertions, for example in “Cold Literature,” when
he argues, “The writer bears no responsibility to the reader
and the reader has no need to make impositions on the
writer. It is for the reader to choose whether or not to read
a work.” (85) Nonetheless, without going as far as Ōe, Gao
has occasionally formulated a less absolute refusal of involve-
ment in “isms” and ethics. For example, he writes in “Liter-
ature as Testimony”: 
A writer’s moral awareness [liangzhi] is an awaken-
ing from instinctive chaos and blind violence. Rather
than an a priori moral conscience [liangxin], should
one not rather call it a pair of clearer eyes that tran-
scend the writer’s view of good and bad, of politics,
and an ensuing capacity for observation that is natu-
rally more penetrating and profound? (86)
Gao rejects moral theories that are imposed from the out-
side (“a priori”) on the complex matter of life and the am-
biguous experience of writing. In this sense, one can indeed
speak of a personal ethics based on “active moral introspec-
tion,” (87) which is also related to his use of pronouns. (88)
Nonetheless, although Ōe’s stance is more explicit, Gao’s
minimal ethical position as a clarity arising from experience
and its literary (even modernistic) configuration is not alien
to Mitsusaburō’s final choice of returning to life in Ōe’s
novel. 
Finally, it has been argued that Gao’s writing should be seen
first and foremost as a personal endeavour, a primarily auto-
biographical reflection on the self and its multiple personas,
in contrast with Ōe’s more politically committed stance relat-
ing the self to the issues of the day. It is important to note
that Ōe’s preoccupation with social questions is also insepa-
rable from his painstaking introspection regarding his own
family, in particular his handicapped son Hikari, who is the
starting point for his thoughts about “survivors,” in particular
the survivors of Hiroshima, and their capacity to transcend
and redeem tragedy. (89) Individual introspection and autobi-
ographical themes, which are present in almost all of Ōe’s
novels, are therefore woven into his reflections on social and
political issues. Conversely, while Gao made clear in Aix
that he did not share Ōe’s confidence in the power of the
grotesque to make the “small, weak voice” of the individual
strong enough to be heard in society or in the world, it is dif-
ficult to see his writing as concerned only with personal is-
sues. Gao calls for a detachment from the personal view-
point that endows even autobiographical writing with a
wider, interpersonal, significance: “When embarking on this
sort of writing, it is best for the writer to be an observer in
order to maintain adequate distance, especially if dealing
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with a historical period fraught with disasters. This will allow
him to avoid the pitfalls of becoming a victim whose writing
is bitter and amounts to nothing more than an indict-
ment.” (90) Fragmenting the self through the use of pronouns,
and taking distance with personal experience through fiction
in order to avoid writing as a victim: these aspects of Gao’s
writing open it up to the world. Therefore, literature can only
be defined as individual “testimony” provided that it also
stands as testimony to the individual in general: “What al-
lows the writer both to observe the world with clarity and to
transcend his (or her) own self is realised in the process of
writing itself.” (91) Conversely, writing is what allows the
writer both to see the world clearly and to transcend his own
individuality. Despite their differences, both Gao and Ōe
are engaged in a dialectics of personal experience and in-
volvement with society and history: marginality in this sense
is not a position removed from the world.
In conclusion, modernity, both socio-political and literary,
appears to Gao Xingjian and Kenzaburō Ōe as a doubtful
enterprise. Though not all modernists were Promethean
prophets, modernity was the period in which literature be-
came inextricably involved with the will to change the world.
For two writers who have personally experienced the conse-
quences of a dysfunctional synthesis between oppressive,
centralising tendencies in the history of their own countries
and European theories of modernisation that brought about
a pairing of industrial modernity with colonial expansion in
the case of Japan and with communist utopianism in China,
modernity itself could probably not come away unscathed. 
Nonetheless, leaving aside the “ism,” they are both clearly
modern in the sense that they defy being read as “anti-mod-
ernists” or “neo-traditionalists.” Their endorsement of
Bakhtinian polyphony (Ōe) and the use of pronouns to
break up the cohesive self (Gao), positioning the writer as
an equally impartial observer of the self and the world, serve
as deterrents to readers who would misconstrue their attach-
ment to the local and the marginal. However, their modern-
ness is one that strives to “overcome” political modernity, to
define a position for literature that is neither involved with
the centre of power nor strives to become an alternative cen-
tre of power. It defines itself, on the contrary, by its margin-
ality and individuality, and its interest in suppressed and re-
mote voices, which it does not necessarily purport to make
stronger. In this sense it is sympathetic to heterodox, vernac-
ular traditions, but decidedly hostile to traditional morals.
This form of modernity does raise an interesting question:
how can the value of individuality be construed from this col-
lection of fragmented, marginal points of view? (92) Or, to put
it another way, where does the individual writer seek the au-
thority to call the reader’s attention to the diversity of the
margins? While both writers stress the importance of reflex-
ivity with respect to experience, for Ōe there is also a ques-
tion of responsibility toward the reader. For Gao, this re-
sponsibility is conceived primarily toward his own life, and
life in general; it is the responsibility not to allow literature
to substitute itself for life. Whether these two marginal posi-
tions, subsequently crowned by the most un-marginal literary
prize of all, define a new type of modernity, and whether
Asian writers can play a defining role in bringing literature
out of the era of ideologies, must be left open to further dis-
cussion. •
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Glossary
hashi 橋 (bridge) hashi 端 (margin) 
jiaohua 教化 jun bungaku 純文學
Kitamura Tokoku 北村透谷 liangxin 良心
liangzhi 良知 Man’en 萬延 Nakae Chōmin 中江兆民
shūhen 週邊 xiandai pai 現代派 xiandai zhuyi 現代主義
xungen 尋根 Yanagita Kunio 柳田國男
zhenli 真理 zhenshi 真實
